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On subjectivity and 'long distance Wh-movement'
Arie Verhagen
1. Introduction
'Subjectivity' is a complex concept.' In particular, the idea has both a di-
mension in which a conceptualizing subject is opposed to an 'object' of
conceptualization, and another one in which one subject's conceptualiza-
tion is compared to that of another. Adopting a specific variant of the nota-
tion for 'grounding' from Langacker (1987, 1990), these two fundamental
dimensions can be said to jointly define the basic construal configuration
(cf. figure 1).
0: Object ofconceptualization:
S: Subject ofconceptualization
(Ground):
Figure 1. The construal configuration and its basic elements
The Ground of any linguistic usage event comprises two conceptualizers,
the first performing the role of being responsible for the utterance, the sec-
ond that of interpreting it in a particular way. In prototypical face-to-face
conversations these roles are fulfilled by the speaker and the addressee,
1. I am grateful to the Netherlands Institute for Advanced Study (NIAS) for pro-
viding me with the opportunity, as a Fellow-in-Residence in the academic year
2002-2003, to do the research for this paper.
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respectively, but the roles as such are given with anything being taken as
an instance of language use, even if no referents for the first and second
role are known. These subjects of conceptualization engage in cognitive
coordination by means of the utterance, with respect to some object of
conceptualization. The relation between the subjects and the object of con-
ceptualization - the vertical one in figure 1 - is, in Langacker's terms, the
construal relationship. Some types of construal are, for example, the per-
ception of an object as determined by a particular point of view, its per-
ception at a particular level of granularity, as a figure or a ground, etcetera.
The relevant cognitive systems of conceptualizers 1 and 2 include their
mutually shared knowledge, including models of each other and of the
discourse situation. Thus, in this conception, the Ground is essentially
"common ground" (Clark 1996).
One dimension of subjectivity in a linguistic expression thus resides in
the construal relationship: a conceptualizer uses the expression to construe
the object of conceptualization in a specific way that is not as such deter-
mined by properties of the object as conceived. The second dimension of
subjectivity is that of cognitive coordination between the subjects of con-
ceptualization themselves - the bottom horizontal line in figure 1. This
conceptual structure is also inherent in any linguistic usage event; anything
we say is an attempt to influence another person's mind, however minimal.
But not all aspects of the construal configuration have to be symbolized,
i.e. marked by means of some linguistic unit which, in the language of the
community involved, is a conventional way to indicate some feature of the
Ground or its relation to the object of conceptualization. Several features
of actual construal configurations often remain fully implicit. For conven-
tional, linguistic markers of subjectivity, the same distinction is relevant:
while certain meanings operate to impose some construal on the object of
conceptualization, others may operate entirely in the dimension of the co-
ordination between subjects of conceptualization. Possible examples of the
latter are markers of epistemic stance (probably), evaluative adjuncts (un-
fortunately) or particles, etcetera. It should be stressed that the conceptual
distinction does not always coincide with a distinction between linguistic
symbols: one linguistic sign may very well conventionally perform func-
tions in both dimensions, while the relative weight of each may also gradu-
ally change over time.
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2. Complementation
2.1. Complementation and intersubjectivity
Many instances of complementation constructions serve to assign some
aspect of subjectivity (expressed in matrix clauses of the type I think, I
hope, etcetera) to a piece of information expressed in the complement
clause. In fact, it may be argued that this is not just a feature of a specific
subset of complementation constructions, but of complementation in gen-
eral. In Verhagen (2005), this conclusion is supported by several kinds of
arguments from the domains of lexicon, grammar and discourse. Here I
will restrict myself to the basic idea, some arguments for it from the do-
main of discourse, and then apply it specifically to the grammatical phe-
nomenon known as 'long distance Wh-movement'.
Consider the question A in (1) and the two answers B1 and B2, and as-
sume that the conversation takes place at 2 PM, while the interlocutors are
traveling in a car, and the distance to their destination - a launch site - is
about a mile.
(1) A: Will we be in time for the launch?
B1: It was scheduledfor 4 PM
B2 : I think it was scheduledfor 4 PM
0: Object ofconceptualization:
/ , /
"S: Subject ofconceptualization I \ I \L ____
- - - - ~ 2 t(Ground): \ \ I
, I , /
"-
/
"
;'
- -
....
- -
".,.
Figure 2. Construal configuration for non-perspectivized utterance (B1 in 1)
Both B1 and B2 constitute a coherent answer to A's question. In the given
context, each furthermore suggests that the answer is in principle positive
(since there is, normally speaking, enough time to travel such a small dis-
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tance), i.e. the utterances B1 and B2 interact in the same way with back-
ground knowledge and assumptions to generate relevant inferences (e.g.
"Don't worry, we'll make it") . Thus, one does not want to say that the two
utterances depict totally different situations (e.g. B1 one of scheduling, B2
one of thinking). Rather, we should say that B1 exemplifies the specific
construal configuration in figure 2, and B2 the one in figure 3.
0: Object ofconceptualization:
S: Subject ofconceptualization
(Ground):
/ ,
I \
- ---f 2 ,
\ I
\ I
"-
,/
.... - "
Figure 3. Construal configuration for first person perspective (B2 in 1)
The bold lines indicate aspects of the construal configuration which are
explicitly marked, because of the conventional meaning of some linguistic
material. B1 provides a (relatively) straightforward presentation of the ob-
ject of conceptualization.' In contrast, some of the linguistic material in B2
- an instance of complementation - explicitly evokes a particular relation-
ship between the object of conceptualization and a participant of the
Ground. The so-called matrix clause I think indicates the speaker's epis-
temic stance. This phrase typically has the effect of making the utterance
sound somewhat less certain; the explicit marking of one participant's cog-
nitive state in principle evokes it being distinct from others, and thus al-
lows the addressee to consider other possibilities more easily than the
straightforward presentation of B1• It is precisely in this sense that the ma-
trix clause in B2 operates on the intersubjective relationship, between the
two subjects of conceptualization. Thus I do not think it is useful to say
2. Of course, an element such as tense is also a grounding predication, i.e. it char-
acterizes the relation between Ground and object of conceptualization in a par-
ticular way. But as the utterances do not differ in this respect, I leave that out of
the discussion and the notation for the purpose of clarity.
On subjectivity and 'long distance Wh-movement' 327
that in a case like B2 the Ground and the construal relationship are being
included in the object of conceptualization. Rather, it makes sense to dis-
tinguish between 'being put onstage', in the sense of being symbolized,
and being an object of conceptualization. In this view, the speaker is not a
part of the object of conceptualization in B2, but she is onstage: part of the
Ground is symbolized explicitly. This way of looking at these utterances
seems to me to be a natural way of accounting for the fact that what is be-
ing communicated by means of B1 and of B2 is essentially the same, as
indicated above, and as has been demonstrated for conversation by Thomp-
son (2002), and in the context of early language acquisition by Diessel and
Tomasello (2001).
What about a complement construction with a third-person, past tense
matrix clause, as in B3 of (I)?
(1) B3 : Someone/Peter said that it was scheduledfor 4 PM
There is a long tradition in linguistics and in philosophy to consider such
constructs as belonging to another type, another category of utterances.
This tradition goes back at least until Benveniste's seminal paper (1966
[1958]) on subjectivity, and, in the philosophy of language, to Austin's
(1962) distinction between performative and constative (or descriptive) use
of verbs of communication. For Benveniste, only first person utterances
such as that of B2 in (1) count as marking of subjectivity, while both B1 and
B3 in his view produce objective utterances. And as is well known, only
first person, present tense use of illocutionary verbs counts as performative
in Austin's analysis, while other forms count as constative, just like utter-
ances that lack such matrix clauses entirely.' In cognitive linguistics, Lan-
gacker (1990: 11-12) has invoked a similar distinction in the context of an
analysis of subjectification. However, I want to propose that such cases
basically do not belong to another functional type of expressions as first
person (present tense) complementation constructs, but that they should
equally count as linguistic manifestations of subjectivity, differing only
from first person cases in their force (in a sense to be explained below).
This is a generalization and to some extent an elaboration and adaptation of
3. Interestingly, Austin limited his discussion to speech act verbs, but others, no-
ticing the parallels in use and structure of expressions like I say and I think,
have extended it (e.g. Diessel and Tomasello 2001: 103-104), thus in effect re-
producing Benveniste's view.
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some suggestions and partial ideas that are present in (other) work by Lan-
gacker (1991: 494-498, 2004), in Achard (1998), as well as in Verhagen
(1995, 2001). In the perspective that 1am adopting, an important reason for
classifying these different constructs in this way, lies in the specific contri-
butions of matrix and complement clauses to the structure of discourse.
Consider the text in (2), which is characterized by a relatively high 'den-
sity' of complementation constructions.
(2) Eerder vertelde ik dat het al gelukt is om klonen van
zoogdierembryo's te kweken. Uit het bovenstaande valt nu af te
leiden dat het binnenkort mogelijk wordt om ook met het DNA van
volwassen dieren nieuwe embryo's te maken. De directeur van
GenTech verwacht zelfs dat dit reeds volgend jaar zal gebeuren.
Anderen zijn van mening dat het misschien wat langer zal duren,
maar niemand twijfelt eraan dat het klonen van een volwassen
schaap ofpaard binnen 10jaar een feit is.
'I have already reported before that there has been success in
breeding clones of mammalian embryo's. From the above it may
now be concluded that it will become possible in the near future to
make new embryo's with the DNA of full-grown animals as well.
The director of GenTech even expects that this will already happen
next year. Others believe that it may take somewhat longer, but no-
body doubts that the cloning of a full-grown sheep or horse will be a
reality within ten years.'
In (2)', the left column lists the contents of the matrix clauses from this
text, and the right column the contents of the complement clauses.
It is quite obvious from this overview that the actual content of the text
is not at all represented by the alleged 'main' clauses, but rather by the
'subordinate' ones. The right hand column, i.e. the series of complement
clauses, represents subsequent objects of conceptualization, i.e. the stages
through which the text develops at level 0 of the construal configuration.
On the other hand, the matrix clauses represent the development of the text
at level S; with each matrix clause, the reader is invited to construe the
object of conceptualization from a particular perspective, in a particular
way, indicated by the lexical content of that clause. The writer is responsi-
ble for all aspects of this presentation, but the force with which the explicit
construal may be attributed to the actual writer is greater when the gram-
matical subject is first person and the tense is simple present, than when
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the subject is third person and/or the tense is not simple present." In the
former kind of expressions, the distance between the onstage conceptual-
izer and the Ground is minimal, and the force with which the explicit con-
strual may be attributed to the actual speaker/writer is maximal. But these
are differences of degree: In complementation constructions, speaker/
hearer-subjectivity is in principle aligned with character-subjectivity (Ver-
hagen 2000) - they have the same orientation.
(2)' 'Main' clauses 'Subordinate' clauses
I have already reported before there has been success in breed-
that ing clones of mammalian em-
bryo's
From the above it may now be
concluded that
The director of GenTech even
expects that
Others believe that
But nobody doubts that
it will become possible in the
near future to make new em-
bryo's with the DNA of full-
grown animals as well
this will already happen next
year
it may take somewhat longer
the cloning of a full-grown sheep
or horse will be a reality within
ten years
The basic function of all complementation constructions is thus to invoke
the Ground," and invite the hearer to adopt a particular subjective perspec-
4. In some instances this force also depends on the lexical meaning of the verb.
For example, one cannot perform the act of threatening by saying I threaten ...
(cf. Verhagen 2000 and references cited there).
5. Cf. Langacker (2004: 553): "a [mite clause describes the proposition it ex-
presses from the vantage point of the speaker, even when it represents the
proposition entertained by another conceptualizer." Langacker demonstrates the
point especially in terms of deictic elements such as tense, while I focus on dis-
course relations here. In general, Langacker's analysis and the one developed
here and in Verhagen (2005) are to a very large extent compatible, though there
may be some differences as well. Langacker (2004: 546) still views the matrix
clause as itself expressing an event or situation that functions as an object of
conceptualization toward which the speaker adopts an epistemic stance - in ef-
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tive on the object of conceptualization, albeit with differences in strength.
Notice that B3 in (1) basically also counts as a positive answer to question
A, just like B1 and B2, but with even less force than B2 • This is what is
figure 4 is intended to represent.
0: Object ofconceptualization:
S: Subject ofconceptualization
(Ground):
/
"I \
--4 2 t
\ /
\ I
......
,/
--
....
Figure 4. Construal configuration for third person perspective (B3 in 1)
The matrix clause operates in the dimension of intersubjective coordina-
tion, but the onstage conceptualizer - whose perspective the addressee is
invited to adopt - is not a speech act participant, so that the force with
which the addressee is so invited is not maximal. As a consequence, there
is at least a possibility of a difference between the explicit, onstage mental
space and the Ground. This makes inferences defeasible. Consider the ex-
change in (3).
(3) A: Can I be in Amsterdam before the match starts?
B1: I promise that I'll have the car up in front at 2 0 'clock.
B2 : John promised that he'll have the car up in front at 2 o'clock.
The point is that both B-utterances count as a positive answer to A's ques-
tion. Traditionally, the utterance of B1 is considered to be displaying sub-
jectivity (Benveniste), or as a performative utterance (Austin), while the
utterance by B2 is considered as descriptive (in the present terminology:
feet the position of Benveniste - while, as explained in the text, I take it as ex-
pressing the (subjective) perspective that the addressee is invited to adopt.
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depicting only an object of conceptualization). However, in the present
analysis, the speaker in both cases invites the addressee to construe the
object of conceptualization as a promise. And (3) shows that in connected
discourse, both utterances in fact count as arguments for the same kind of
conclusions. But because of the third person and the past tense in B2, indi-
cating that the onstage conceptualizer is distinct from conceptualizer 1, the
force of the argument of B2 is not maximal; it may therefore be annulled,
unlike the utterance of'Bj. The use of the contrastive conjunction but in (4)
confirms that the orientation of the entire utterance is positive, but the fact
that this constitutes a coherent discourse also shows that the inference is
defeasible, and that the force of the argument is not maximal. The incoher-
ence of (5), on the other hand, shows that the force of the argument ofBj is
maximal.
(4) John promised that he'll have the car up in front at 2 0 'clock.
But he might have forgotten the route to your new home.
(5) #1promise that I'll have the car up in front at 2 0 'clock. But I
might forget the route to your new home.
The intuition that first person expressions are 'more subjective' than third
person ones should thus not be interpreted as implying that the latter are
'more objective'. Rather, we should say that third person expressions dis-
play 'less speaker/hearer-subjectivity' (or 'more character-subjectivity'), in
the sense that the force with which the speaker orients the addressee to the
relevant conclusions is not maximal.
2.2. 'Long distance Wh-movement'
This analysis is elaborated in more detail in Verhagen (2005, ch. 3). In the
remainder of this paper, I want to tum to a specific issue in the syntax of
complementation, the phenomenon known as long distance Wh-movement.
This has been a continuous topic of central concern in syntax since early
days of generative grammar, especially since Chomsky's seminal paper
from 1977 on the topic. Some examples given by Chomsky are (6) and (7).6
6. These are examples (32) and (10) in Chomsky (1977), respectively.
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(6) Who did Mary say that John kissed t.
(7) Who did Mary hope [8 that Tom would tell Bill [8 that he should
visit t ] ]
The theoretical interest of such examples lies in the fact that the question
phrases (' Wh-elements') appear to occupy a position in a clause that does
not determine their syntactic role. In (6), Who is the first element of the
matrix clause ('Mary said that. ..'), while the verb to which it bears the
relation of direct object is not said but kissed, in the subordinate clause;
thus it seems to be moved from a position in 'its own clause', indicated by
t (for 'trace'), to one outside it (hence the name for the phenomenon). In
(7), the preposed Wh-element even seems to have originated more than one
clause 'down'. Normally, a constituent can only receive a role from an
element (typically the verb) in the same clause, so these phenomena are
intriguing. Precisely because they appear to violate the normal structural
integrity and autonomy of clauses, they offer a unique opportunity for
identifying the factors that cause clauses to behave syntactically in the way
they do.
When the phenomenon is described in this way, the only difference
between the clauses that is considered relevant is their hierarchical rela-
tionship: the clause in which the Wh-element plays a syntactic role is prop-
erly contained ('embedded') in the one where the element is actually posi-
tioned. Otherwise, they are both just clauses, each viewed as an abstract
structural unit characterized by the presence of a verb and its participant
noun phrases. In the previous section, however, I have argued that matrix
clauses differ systematically from complements in that the former evoke
the intersubjective dimension of the construal configuration. One might
thus expect that this difference also has consequences for the phenomenon
of long distance Wh-movement, and this is what I will explore in the next
section.
3. 'Long distance Wh-movement' in actual language use
3.1. A corpus based analysis
At the end of section 2.1, I mentioned the fact that in first-person matrix
clauses, the distinctness of the onstage conceptualizer (the referent of the
grammatical subject) from the Ground is minimal, while there may be a
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larger degree of distinctness between these two with third person (and/or
non-present tenses). What I will argue now is that precisely the notion of
minimal vs. non-minimal distinctness of the onstage mental space and the
Ground is crucial for understanding what is going on in instances of 'long
distance Wh-movement' as it occurs in actual language use. More specifi-
cally, any additional special machinery, whether formal or functional, to
constrain the 'displacement' of question phrases, turns out not to be
needed.
To start, notice that the distance between an onstage conceptualizer and
the actual Ground is minimal when the onstage one is first person in case
the utterance is a statement. When it is a question, this distance can only be
minimal if the onstage conceptualizer is a second person, basically the
second person pronoun (you), since the question probes the addressee's
mind, not the speaker's. Consider example (8).
(8) Do you think we will be in time for the launch?
This is the utterance with an explicit conceptualizer that is minimally dif-
ferent from the question Will we be in time for the launch?, not the utter-
ance I ask you if we will be in time for the launch, let alone Do I think... or
I don't know if we will be in time for the launch. So what is marked in the
intersubjective dimension in (8) is, as indicated in figure 5, the mirror im-
age of what is marked in I think we will be in time for the launch, i.e. B2 ' s
declarative utterance in (1) (cf. figure 3).
0: Object ofconceptualization:
S: Subject ofconceptualization
(Ground):
/
\
,
--'
" \
,---.._-
1
/
Figure 5. Construal configuration for second person perspective in question
334 Arie Verhagen
Now consider the following examples, from two electronic corpora of
Dutch and English. The examples in (9) are 4 of the 7 instances of long
distance Wh-movement in the Dutch 'Eindhoven Corpus', those in (10) are
8 of the 11 instances in the English 'Brown Corpus'.
(9) a. Hoe denkt u dat de AKV-gedachten in de
How think you that the AKV-thoughts In the
gemeenten zullen landen?
commumties will land
'How do you think the local councils will react to the ideas of the
AKV?'
b. En wat denk je dat ie zei, die prins?
And what think you that he said that prmce
'And what do you think this prince said?'
c. Wie denk je dat je voorhebt, om me
Who think you that you have-in-front-of for me
zo te tekenen?
thus to draw
'Who do you think I am, drawing a picture of me like that?'
d. Waarom dacht je dat dit geslacht tot nu toe
Why thought you that this lineage till now to
alleen maar vrouwen voortbracht? Voor de loll
only PART women produced For the fun
'Why do you think this family has produced so many women up
to now? As ajoke?'
(10) a. 'Fools', he bayed, 'what do you think you are doing?'
b. What does he think a remark like this 'lousy' one does to our
prestige and morale?
c. What conclusions do you think he might come to?
d. What you think I care about that?
e. What did she think he could do?
f. What the hell do you think baseball is?
g. Who do you think pays the rent?
h. And what would you say he wants to do?
Two properties clearly stand out in all instances in these corpora: the
dominance of the verbs denken in Dutch and think in English, and the
dominance of second person pronouns as subjects of the matrix clauses.
Among the English instances there is only one case with another verb than
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think, viz. say in (10)h, in the Dutch set there is none. As these corpora are
relatively small, I extended the search with the 1995 volume of the Dutch
newspaper de Volkskrant (available on cd-rom). This resulted in a collec-
tion of 43 instances, which is certainly sufficient to draw general conclu-
sions. This larger corpus indeed contained examples with other verbs than
denken 'think', e.g. zeggen 'say' in (11), vinden 'find', 'feel' in (12), and
willen 'want to' in (13).7
(11) En wat zei je nou dat die Cornell had
And what said you now that that Cornell had
bereikt?
achieved
'And what did you say now that this Cornell had achieved?'
(12) Hoe vind je dat Kok het in de laatste
How find you that Kok it in the latest
verkiezingen heeft gedaan?
elections has done
'How do you feel Kok performed in the latest election?'
(13) Waar wil je dan dat ik het over heb?
Where want you then that I it about have
'What do you want me to talk about then?'
Also, other subjects than second person pronouns could be found, such as a
lexical noun phrase in (14), and a proper noun in (15).
(14) Wat denken
What think
Ben W dat
Mayor and Aldermen that
onze burgers
our citizens
7. The advantage of the smaller corpora is that they have grammatical tagging,
while the Volkskrant corpus does not. The search in the latter corpus was thus
rather complicated, essentially consisting of a series of searches for a lexically
specified complement taking verb, preceded by a Wh-element, followed by date
The latter helps narrowing the search, and does not lead to loss of data as this
element is obligatory in Dutch. The series of searches started with the most fre-
quent complement taking verbs (independently established), and proceeded with
less frequent ones. Therefore, it is theoretically possible that that there are one
or two more instances in the corpus which I did not notice, viz. with a low fre-
quency complement taking verb. But this is not very likely, and it would not
change the conclusions anyway.
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zullen denken van za'n dure buitenlandse reis?
will think of such-a expensive foreign trip
'What do Mayor and Aldermen think that our citizens will feel
about such an expensive trip abroad?'
(15) Hoe denkt Oudkerk dat dit in zijn werk is gegaan?
How thinks Oudkerk that this in its work IS gone
'How does Oudkerk think this was done?'
However, these cases are quite exceptional. Consider the numbers in tables
1 and 2, listing the different complement taking verbs ('CT-verbs') and
matrix subjects found in the larger corpus.
Table 1. CT-verbs used with 'long distance Wh-movement' in de Volkskrant
(1995)
Tokens/verb Verbs (types) # Tokens:
34 denken 'think' 34
5 willen 'want to' 5
2 zeggen 'say', vinden 'feel', 'think' 4
# Types: 4 43
Table 2. Matrix subjects used with 'long distance Wh-movement' in de
Volkskrant (1995)
Tokens/subject Subject types
36 2nd person pronoun (je: 25, u: lO,jij: 1)
3 3rd person pronoun (ze: 2, zij: 1)
3 definite noun phrase with lexical head
1 1st person pronoun (ex. (18) below)
#Tokens:
36
3
3
1
43
Of the 43 instances, as much as 34 have denken as their matrix verb, and
36 a second person pronoun as the matrix subject; 28 cases have both. This
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provides strong evidence for the entrenchment of a rather specific pattern,
which may be represented as in (16).
(16) Prototypical 'long distance Wh-movement' (Dutch):
Wh...- denk - pron2nd dat ...
It is interesting to note that the frequency of the exact combination 'Wh-
denk-2ndPerson - dat ...' in de Volkskrant (viz. 28) is of the same order of
magnitude, both in relative and absolute numbers, as that of other combi-
nations that are well entrenched, such as the default case of the Dutch way
construction, with the unique verb banen (Verhagen 2002: 412). Further-
more, the high frequency of think and of second person pronouns cannot be
attributed to the general frequency of these elements: in this newspaper
corpus, other CT-verbs - especially zeggen ('say') and vinden ('feel/be of
the opinion') - are considerably more frequent than denken , and lexical
nouns and third person pronouns are much more frequent than second per-
son pronouns (for details see Verhagen 2005: ch. 3).
The well-entrenched pattern in (16), being quite specific, must be said
to occupy a relatively low position in the hierarchy of complementation
constructions, as indicated in figure 6 below.
In the usage based view of grammatical structure, the token frequency
of similar usage events (represented by rounded boxes) forms the basis for
the entrenchment of several specific patterns, such as Ik denk dat... (Eng-
lish I think...; cf. Thompson 2002; Diessel and Tomasello 2001), Denk je
dat ... (English Do you think...; not included in figure 6), and also Wh-denk-
2ndPersonPronoun-dat... (English Wh-do-you-think...). Similarities among
these form the basis for the abstraction of a more general pattern, such as
the 'complement taking verb' denken ('think'), but precisely because it is
an abstraction, not all properties of the more specific patterns 'percolate' to
the more general node in the network. On the other hand, a high type fre-
quency (large number of different lexical verbs occurring in a similar envi-
ronment) constitutes the basis for the abstraction of a general, productive
pattern for complementation constructions, indicated at the top of figure 6.8
8. Cf. Bybee (1995) for the basic idea about the connection between type and
token frequency, entrenchment, and productivity. See Croft and Cruse (2004:
ch, 11) for an extension to the domain of syntax.
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Y - Verb dat...
Y denk- dat...
Figure 6. 'Long distance Wh-movement' in the Dutch complementation construc-
tion network.
An important implication of this perspective is that the properties of 'long
distance Wh-movement' do not follow from general properties of comple-
mentation, and thus also should not be accounted for in such general terms.
The template licensing such constructs constitutes a relatively concrete,
low-level pattern, which has some properties that do not percolate upwards
in the network to the level of productive rules. In other words: the fact that
sentences seem to exhibit 'displaced' constituents of this kind is no evi-
dence that such displacement follows from any general property of com-
plementation, as they instantiate such a low-level template. Instances that
do not fully conform to it, can be seen as analogical extensions from this
prototype; only if the degree of deviation from the prototypical pattern
would frequently be large, a situation might arise in which the displace-
ment could generalize to a more abstract level. However, the actually oc-
curring extensions in the present corpus never deviate from (16) in more
than one respect. When the matrix verb is not denken ('think'), the subject
is always second person (cf. examples 11-13), and when the subject is not
second person, the matrix verb is denken (cf. examples 14-15). That is,
cases like Chomsky's (6) and (7) are not instantiated in this material. Ex-
ample (6) deviates the least from the prototype, as it can be constructed out
of features of actually occurring instances ('blending' a third person sub-
ject with another verb than think), so that it constitutes a rather easy
analogical extension. The construction of an example like (7) requires
blending it with another template (for embedding complements), a feature
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not instantiated in actual usage for this phenomenon at all, and it thus ap-
pears highly artificial.
Pursuing this line of reasoning, we may hypothesize that invented sen-
tences exhibiting 'long distance Wh-movement' will be worse, the more
they deviate from the prototype. Consider the series of sentences in (17).
(17) a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
What did you say that the workers had done?
What did he say that the workers had done?
What did the trade union leader say that the workers had done?
What had the trade union leader said that the workers had done?
What did the trade union leader concede that the workers had
done?
What did the trade union leader concede to a journalist after the
press conference that the workers had done?
What had the trade union leader conceded to a journalist after
the press conference that the workers had done?
Of course, there is no problem with (17)a. Sentences band c are both a
mixture of features that can be found in actual instances, so also fully ac-
ceptable. However, some speakers start having reservations with sentences
d and e; these exhibit, besides the non-prototypical lexical subject, an 'ab-
normal' tense (perfect rather than simple past in d), and an 'abnormal' CT-
verb (concede), respectively. The addition of an addressee and a temporal
adjunct in f makes this case less acceptable for more speakers, and hardly
anyone finds g, which combines all these 'abnormal' features, acceptable
at al1.9 Purely structurally, however, these sentences are all of the same
kind, so that the cline in acceptability confirms the hypothesis that the spe-
cial properties of long distance Wh-movement do not in fact reflect general
properties of complementation constructions.
This view is corroborated, in a surprising way, by evidence from lan-
guage acquisition presented by Dabrowska (2004: 196--200). Although the
phenomenon is not very frequent in children's speech, young children do
understand and produce constructs of this kind. Understandably, their ap-
9. The tendencies reported here have been obtained from judgments delivered on
the Dutch analogues of the sentences in (17) by first and second year college
students who had not yet taken a syntax course. The results parallel those of the
more sophisticated judgment elicitation test conducted by Dabrowska (2004:
198-199).
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pearance follows that of simpler 'matrix clauses' of the type I think, as well
as that of simpler Wh-questions. But the interesting point in the present
context is that such utterances occur around age four, while children have
not even mastered the full generality of the network of complementation
constructions at age five; in fact, Diessel and Tomasello (2001: 134) claim
that by that age children have only learned the templates at the bottom of
the network. This implies that they cannot have constructed their (under-
standing of) apparent 'long distance Wh-movement' utterances on the basis
of general rules; and as Dabrowska observes, these utterances are highly
formulaic. The fact that they are also highly formulaic in adult language
use, as shown in the present study," strongly suggests that, while adults do
develop knowledge of general templates for complementation construc-
tions, the 'long distance Wh-movement' template (16) remains a kind of
'island' (cf. Verhagen 2002: 414-415) in the ultimate network of con-
structions, with specific properties that do not 'percolate' upwards. In the
next section, I will argue that there are in fact good reasons for this restric-
tion.
3.2. Usage and subjectivity
The fact that 'long distance Wh-movement' is not to be explained in terms
of the properties of complementation constructions in general does not
imply that it is 'just lexical', i.e. that it would only be governed by some
arbitrary lexical items (a few verbs and a few pronouns). It is no coinci-
dence that actual instances of the phenomenon look similar in different
languages. Nor is it a coincidence that the matrix clauses have the kind of
content that they actually have. Recall that I started section 3 by pointing
out that, for questions, a matrix clause like Do you think... creates the kind
of utterance in which the distinction between the onstage conceptualizer
and the Ground is minimal, as it is the addressee's mind that is being
probed by the question. This kind of clause is the interrogative variant of I
think in the case of declaratives, and thus it is intimately connected to the
specific, well entrenched 'complementation' patterns that are acquired
early, and used frequently in conversation to mark speaker's epistemic
stance (Thompson 2002). They belong to a set of prototypical patterns for
10. They are also highly formulaic in the adult input speech in Dabrowska's mate-
rial.
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explicitly signaling aspects of the intersubjective dimension of the con-
strual configuration. So even though they are located at a 'low' level in the
network of complementation constructions, the region that they occupy is a
central one. We have here a particularly revealing example of what Bybee
and Hopper (2001:3) noticed about the relationship between subjectivity
and frequency, which I quote in reverse order here:
2. The frequency with which certain items and strings of items are used has
a profound influence on the way language is broken up into chunks in
memory storage, the way such chunks are related to other stored material
and the ease with which they are accessed.
1. The distribution and frequency of the units of language are governed by
the content of people's interactions, which consist of a preponderance of
subjective, evaluative statements ...
Frequency has a profound effect on the storage and processing of linguistic
units, but this frequency is in tum, in the terminology used in this paper,
determined by the fact that language use is always a matter of intersubjec-
tive coordination.
Given this analysis, we can also assign a functional interpretation to the
cline of acceptability in (17) in the previous section. The use of a third
person subject and the addition of an addressee and/or a temporal adjunct,
make the onstage situation increasingly different from the Ground; the
more elements are introduced that are not present in the Ground, the more
the suggestion is evoked that conceptualizer 1 is not just inviting the ad-
dressee to adopt a particular perspective on the content of the complement,
but to draw his attention to the participants, time frame, and other features
of another situation than the one in the complement, viz. the one depicted
in the matrix clause. To the extent that a reader or hearer of, for example,
(17)f is able to still construe it as an extension of the pattern in (16), he
may find it interpretable and acceptable, but if that fails, the only way to
construe it is as a description of two independent, albeit connected situa-
tions; in that case (subordination in the traditional sense, so to speak), no
'displacement' of participants is possible.
Another implication, related to the previous one, is that the extensions
from the prototype that actually do occur, should be clearly linked to it, i.e.
recognizable as relating to the actual Ground. In fact, this is strikingly con-
firmed when we take a somewhat closer look at these actual extensions, in
particular the cases with third person subjects. The other verbs than think
are relatively unproblematic, as these (want to, say, feel, see table 1) are
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minimal specifications of the manner in which a conceptualizer entertains a
thought, which is immediately relevant to the intersubjective coordination
in the Ground. Another subject than second person, on the other hand, at
first sight does seem to suggest a substantial difference between the
Ground and the onstage conceptualizer. So what we should expect is that it
must be easy for the addressee of the question to identify with the onstage
subject of conceptualization; put differently: that it must be easy to inter-
pret the onstage conceptualizer as the actual addressee of the question, for
in such cases the conceptual distance between the onstage perspective and
the Ground would still be minimal. In fact, in the majority of the 6 third
person instances in the present material, it is quite clear from the context
that this is precisely what is going on. An example is (14), the translation
of which is repeated here:
(14) What do Mayor and Aldermen think that our citizens will think
ofsuch an expensive trip abroad?
As it turns out, this is a representation, in direct speech, of an utterance by
a member of the city council, addressed to the Mayor and Aldermen, in a
public session of the council.
Particularly revealing is the single example of a first person onstage
conceptualizer, which I have not discussed so far:
(18) Waarom denk ik dat die twee elke avond
Why think I that those two each evenmg
rondhangen in het hotel?
hang-around in the hotel
'Why do I think these two hang around in the hotel every night?'
When considered out of context, this is simply a case of local Wh-fronting,
not a 'long distance' case. That is, it is not a question about the reason for
'these two' to hang around in the hotel, but a self-addressed question about
the reason for my thinking that they are. However, the context (in a story
from a reporter about meeting some peculiar Libyan man in Tripoli) is of a
very special kind; cf. (19):
(19) Ik mag hem Eunice noemen .... Doet iets in hotels} iets bij een bank
- en die twee vrouwen daar moest ik maar eens in de gaten houden.
Marokkaansen. Waarom denk ik dat die twee elke avond
rondhangen in het hotel? Juist. Libische vrouwen doen dat niet.
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'I may call him Eunice .... Does something in hotels, something
with a bank - and I'd better keep an eye on those two women over
there. Moroccan. Why do 1 think these two hang around in the hotel
every night? Right. Libyan women don't do that. '
This is 'free indirect speech' (Banfield 1982; Sanders 1994), in which the
writer/journalist functions as the deictic center ('I'), but the sentences rep-
resent not the writer's thoughts, but a character's - in this case the man
named Eunice. Thus the question is Eunice's, and the word ik ('I') actually
denotes the addressee of this question. In other words, the addressee of the
question (conceptualizer 2 in the Ground) and the onstage conceptualizer
('I') are the same, the distance between these two mental spaces is mini-
mal, the matrix clause is interpreted as explicitly marking the perspective
of the addressee, and the entire question is interpreted as concerning the
reason for the situation mentioned in the 'complement' clause, making it
appear as a case of 'long distance Wh-movement'. The fact that this free
indirect speech character is necessary and sufficient to produce this reading
provides striking confirmation of the hypothesis that 'long distance Wh-
movement' sentences are in fact licensed by a specific template that has a
specific meaning, with the part 'do you think' functioning in the dimension
of intersubjectivity, to put the addressee's perspective onstage.
4. Conclusion
A crucial aspect of this approach is that it does not so much provide an
explanation in terms of function rather than structure, but invokes differ-
ences of both structure and function at different levels of specificity of
grammatical templates. In this respect, the present analysis is both different
from, and superior to, previous formal accounts of 'long distance Wh-
movement', as well as semantic/pragmatic ones. The best elaborated ex-
ample of the latter, employing notions of information structure, can be
traced back to Erteschik-Shir (1973). In terms of Erteschik-Shir (1997):
'islands [i.e. configurations out of which elements cannot be 'moved'] are
environments which cannot provide the main focus of the sentence'
(Erteschik-Shir 1997: 225). However, the strong correlations between 'long
distance Wh-movement' on the one hand, and the verb think and second
person subject on the other, neither have a purely structural explanation
nor one in terms of 'focus-structure'. From the point of view of the present
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analysis, both types of approaches suffer from the idea that the explanation
must be sought at some relatively abstract level of structure or function.
Diessel and Tomasello (2001) and Thompson (2002) claim that ele-
mentary 'complementation constructions' are actually mono-clausal (not
one clause embedded in another), with the part traditionally considered the
'main clause' actually being a marker of epistemic stance. In their view, a
minority of complementation constructions used by adults actually de-
scribe two situations, one construed as part of the other, and these are ac-
quired in later stages of language acquisition, as a more comprehensive
network of complementation constructions develops, hand in hand with
cognitive development as children come to understand that different people
may differ in their beliefs about the same state of affairs (Diessel and To-
masello 2001: 133-136). In this paper, I have generalized one aspect of this
analysis to all complementation constructions, claiming that matrix clauses
in all of them relate to the intersubjective dimension of the construal con-
figuration, inviting the addressee to adopt a particular perspective on the
object of conceptualization represented in the complement clause. On the
other hand, I have analyzed the functional and structural difference be-
tween elementary complementation constructions and more elaborate ones
as a matter of degree; the force with which conceptualizer 1 invites con-
ceptualizer 2 in the construal configuration to adopt the perspective pre-
sented in the matrix clause is maximal only when the conceptual distance
between the Ground and the relevant onstage conceptualizer is minimal.
The more the function of the matrix part in such a construct conforms to
this prototypical intersubjective usage, the easier it is to interpret a pre-
posed Ulh-element as questioning a conceptual element of the complement
part only, and this exhausts the principles needed to understand the phe-
nomenon and its limits. At the same time, this testifies to the usefulness of
construing the construal configuration as I have proposed here and else-
where.
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